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Militancy in Many Forms: Teachers Strikes 
and Urban Insurrection, ig6y—y4
Maijorie Murphy
Public school teacher militancy appeared suddenly in the late 1960s, though 
the movement for teacher unionism was quite mature, dating to the early 
twentieth century. Like the rank-and-file militancy in other sectors, teacher 
activism drew some of its strength from a new, younger workforce, very 
much dedicated to the social issues of the day, including desegregation and 
ending the Vietnam War. The examples of civil rights activists, student 
antiwar demonstrators, feminists, and other social movement protesters 
inspired teachers to confront school boards, mayors, and state legislatures in 
a wave of strikes and protests demanding better wages, improved working 
conditions, and more funding for schools. Unlike most workplace militants 
in other sectors, teacher activists mobilized in an environment—the pubhc 
school system—that was the locus of struggle for another powerful social 
movement, namely that of African Americans. Inevitably, teachers and their 
unions would encounter African American pubhc school activists fighting 
for desegregation and greater community control over their schools. What 
was not inevitable was the shape of this encounter.
Often, across the country, teacher unions and civil rights leaders could 
find common cause, or at least avoid conflict. In several large urban settings, 
however, the rise of Black Power, particularly its separatist tendency, led to 
a series of complicated confrontations between African American activists 
and militant teachers, with tragic results. In New York City’s Ocean HiU- 
BrownsviUe section and in Newark, New Jersey, these confrontations 
weakened the teachers’ unions and undermined the potential for meaningful 
community control of the schools. They bitterly divided the American 
Federation of Teachers (AFT), and what had been a very progressive union 
grew more conservative, a shift that made it easier for its rival, the National 
Education Association (NEA), to recruit the growing number of teachers 
interested in unionism. The reasons for the AFT’s shift have much to do
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with the rise to national leadership of Albert Shanker as AFT president; 
it was his neo-conservative approach to education that most alienated 
teachers and weakened the uniond
The Rise of Teacher Militancy
The number of work stoppages by public workers in the years after World 
War II added up to no more than a handful until the 1960s. In most states, 
legislation prohibited public workers, including teachers, policemen, and 
firemen, from striking. The prohibition was so strong that many unions, as 
a matter of course, adopted anti-strike pledges; others, however, clung to 
the right without ever using it. In 1962, President John F. Kennedy, advised 
by New York City Mayor Robert Wagner, issued Executive Order 10988, 
establishing collective bargaining rights for federal government workers. 
Four years earlier, Wagner had issued a similar Executive Order of his own, 
number 49, known as the “Little Wagner Act,” which allowed collective 
bargaining for the city’s workers. Other cities and states enacted similar 
legislation.
While most jurisdictions still prohibited strikes by public employees, 
the more accommodating legal environment encouraged public sector 
worker militancy, including work stoppages. Many of these strikes were 
recognition and first-contract strikes, because, despite the new laws, 
public sector workers still had to mobilize to convince local and state 
authorities to bargain. By the mid-sixties, there had been 142 work 
stoppages by public workers nationwide. The number grew to 169 in 
1967 and 254 in 1968, compared to 15 in 1958. This rise in militancy 
accelerated in the late 1960s, with 411 public worker strikes in 1968 and 
412 in 1969. The number dropped slightly in the early seventies and 
averaged about 375 for the rest of the decade. After 1981, the number of 
strikes fell dramatically.^
1 The author wishes to thank Cal Winslow and Marty Goldensohn, Aaron 
Brenner, and Carole Mackenoff for their comments and encouragement. On teacher 
militancy, see D. Selden, The Teacher Rebellion (Washington, DC: Howard University 
Press, 1985), pp. 75-80; M. Murphy, Blackboard Unions: The AFT and the NEA, igoo- 
igSo (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 226; S. Aronowitz, Prom the Ashes of 
the Old: American Labor and America’s Future (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998); T. 
W. Kheel, “Strikes and Public Employment,” Michigan Law Review vol. 67:5 (March 
1969). pp- 93i“42; and P. Buhle, Taking Care of Business: Samuel Gompers, George 
Meany, Lane Kirkland, and the Tragedy of American Labor (New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1999), pp. 146-203.
2 US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics 
1966-82.
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Teachers were some of the most militant public sector unions. They 
engaged in more than 300 teachers’ strikes during the sixties, and in 1967 
alone teachers nationwide walked out at least 105 times. David Selden, 
former AFT leader, calculated that at least 1,000 school districts experienced 
a strike or threatened strike during the hard-fought representation struggles 
of the 1960s, and another 2,000—3,000 districts saw job actions of one kind 
or another, short of a strike.^
The teachers union in New York City, the United Federation of 
Teachers (UFT), was one of the oldest teachers unions in the country. 
In the fall of i960, it engaged in a one-day walkout aimed at winning 
union recognition. With more than half the teachers walking picket lines at 
hundreds of schools throughout the city, the demonstration had its effect; 
the city agreed to a union election for the following spring, which the UFT 
won. Teachers demanded a pay raise, sick pay for substitutes, a fifty-mmute 
break for lunch, and binding arbitration, but when negotiations dragged 
on into the spring of 1962, the union called another strike. It lasted only 
one day, but convinced the state to provide the funds to meet the teachers 
demands. They won the first comprehensive collective bargaining contract 
for teachers in the country
New York City teachers were not alone in growing more determined 
and militant. The success of union organizing and mobilization m the 
Big Apple led the AFT (of which the UFT was the largest local) to send 
organizers around the country, and the results were immediate. Detroit 
teachers won collective bargaining rights in 19647 ^tid the next year, in 
neighboring Hamtramck, teachers, like the auto workers of the 1930s, held 
a two-week sit-down strike. Teachers in Pittsburgh walked out a few years 
later, and when they were arrested, the public outcry led a judge to release 
them. Teacher militancy helped establish the political clout of their unions. 
During several strikes by teachers in Gary, Indiana, the city s first African 
American mayor, elected with support of the black teachers, mediated 
favorable settlements. Nationwide, the AFT s efforts led to skyrocketing 
growth as the union expanded from 60,000 to 200,000 members between 
i960 and 1970.
3 Selden, Teacher Rebellion, pp. 109-10. See also www.aft.org/about/history.
4 J. B. Freeman, Working Class New York: Life and Labor Since World War II (New York; 
New Press, 2000), pp. 49, 203; C. Carson, In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 
1960s (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981); W. C. Hogan, Many Minds, One 
Heart: SNCC’s Dream for a New America (Chapel HiU: University of North Carolina Press, 
2007), Part Two; and T. Hayden, Reunion: A Memoir (New York: Random House, 1988), 
pp. 129, 161-4.
232 MURPHY
Teacher Militancy Confronts Urban Unrest
The arc of teacher militancy coincided with rising urban unrest and 
escalating protests against the Vietnam War, but it was no coincidence. 
Teachers in the nation’s big cities had watched as their chronically 
underfunded schools deteriorated. They held their employers, the boards 
of education, responsible for the terrible conditions and saw their militancy 
as a means to force the cities and states to improve the schools. They took 
a further step by connecting the conditions in the schools to larger issues 
of war, crime, unemployment, and racism. Such links were obvious to 
teachers, many of whom, for example, found themselves teaching young 
African American men of draft age who used high school to avoid the draft 
much as middle-class young white men used college. The inequalities 
of the draft and the American education system were manifest in the 
classroom. As teachers increasingly made these connections, they made 
the struggles of their communities part of their own struggles for better 
schools.
The AFT had considerable credibility in these efforts, because it was one 
of the most progressive unions in the country. Despite a substantial loss of 
membership in the South equaling some 18 percent of total membership, 
the union began desegregating in 1956 by combining its African American 
and lily-white locals a full fifteen years before the NEA did likewise. 
Teachers and AFT leaders funded and joined civil rights demonstrations, 
desegregation marches, and struggles for greater school funding in African 
American districts. Richard Parrish, an African American teacher and vice 
president of the UFT and AFT, led an integrated group of teachers to 
Prince Edward County, Virginia, in 1963 to start what later became known 
as Freedom Schools in the African American community. As a result of this 
type of activity, the AFT had strong relationships with local and national 
civil rights organizations, particularly around efforts to integrate the schools, 
and it won to its ranks thousands of African American teachers who saw the 
union as a means to fight racism.®
Relationships between the AFT and African American leaders were 
not without their tensions, and those tensions grew, especially in New 
York City, as both teacher militancy and the African American stmggle 
accelerated in the late 1960s. Signs of growing conflict emerged in 1967 
during the UFT’s bargaining for a new contract in New York City. In
5 L. Buder, “City Stands Fast in School Dispute,” New York Times, September 5, 1967, p. 
i; “Another Opinion, Why the Teachers Are Not Teaching,” New York Times, September 
17, 1967, p. E15.
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addition to a wage increase, the union had a series of demands related to 
the classroom. The teachers asked for more control over the curriculum, 
professional preparation time, paraprofessionals in the classroom, and 
the power to remove disruptive children. The union also demanded the 
expansion of its More Effective Schools (MES) program. This program, 
which the Board of Education adopted first in 1965 for about a dozen 
schools, called for smaller schools, a radical reduction in class size, the 
introduction of pre-K classes, and the use of teams of psychologists, social 
workers, and other specialists to work with students and their parents to 
address the impact of poverty and prejudice. In 1967, the UFT demanded 
that more schools be included in MES and that the city commit to lobbying 
the New York State Legislature to match its funding for MES. As part of 
the campaign, the union pointed to the false promises made by the Board 
of Education in Harlem, Bedford-Stuyvesant, and Ocean Hill-Brownsville. 
UFT leaders invited reporters to photograph the dilapidated schoolrooms 
in those areas and highlighted the rise in the crime statistics in the city’s 
schools. After a two-week strike in the fall of 1967, the UFT won most 
of its demands, including, remarkably, the city’s commitment to petition 
Albany for greater funding.^
With this victory, UFT leaders thought they had successfully combined 
the social progressivism of unionism with the push to reform education 
and save the city’s poorest schools. “We thought [the union] was a vehicle 
for social change,” one teacher leader recalled.’ On the contrary, during 
the strikes the teachers found themselves excoriated in the community and 
the press. One New York Times columnist remarked, “Working teacher 
turned against non-working teacher, Negro parents (who three years ago 
had boycotted the schools with UFT support in protest against de facto 
segregation) charged the union with callousness toward slum children.” 
Behind the criticism was a shift in the political context in New York
6 R. Teilhet, Oral History, American Federation of Teachers Oral History Project, 
Walter Reuther Archives, Wayne State University; Buder, “City Stands Fast in School 
Dispute,” New York Times', Murphy, Blackboard Unions, pp. 232—51; B. Carter, Pickets, 
Parents, and Power: The Story Behind the New York City Teachers’ Strike (New York: Citation 
Press, 1971); D. Ravitch, The Great School Wars: New York, iSo^-igy^: A History of the Public 
Schools as Battleground for Social Change (New York: Basic Books, 1974); J. A. Gordon, 
Why They Couldn’t Wait: A Critique of the Black-Jewish Conflict over Ocean Hill-Brownsville, 
1967-1971 (New York: RoutledgeFalmer, 2001); C. Taylor, Knocking at Our Own Door: 
Milton Galamison and the Struggle to Integrate New York City Schools (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1997), pp. 176-207; J. E. Podair, The Strike That Changed New York: Blacks, 
Whites and the Ocean Hill-Brownsville Crisis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).
7 R. Teilhet, Oral History, American Federation ofTeachers Oral History Project, Walter 
Reuther Archives, Wayne State University; Buder, “City Stands Fast in School Dispute.” 
New York Times.
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City and nationwide. The negotiations and strike had taken place against 
the background of major urban riots in the summer of 1967 in Tampa, 
Cincinnati, Atlanta, Newark, northern New Jersey (East Orange, Jersey 
City, Englewood, Plainfield, New Brunswick), and Detroit. Cities were 
in flames, dozens killed, and the turmoil lasted through the fall and winter.
The urban unrest accompanied and encouraged the emerging Black 
Power movement, which shifted the emphasis of the African American 
struggle from integration to empowerment. The Student Non-Violent 
Coordinating Committee became an exclusively African American 
organization, as Stokely Carmichael declared that “integration is irrelevant.” 
Community-based organizations, such as the Black Panthers and the 
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), rose to prominence. When it 
came to schools, these organizations were more interested in community 
control than desegregation. They wanted a thoroughgoing transformation 
of education that would address the specific needs and culture of African 
American children, including an Afro-centric curriculum. As they saw it, 
such an education was part and parcel of the larger social transformation they 
advocated for their communities and American society generally. In carrying 
out their activity, these community-based African American organizations 
differentiated between “the establishment” and “the community,” and they 
usually identified teachers and their unions with the estabhshment.
The new breed of African American activists, which in New York 
City included most prominently Robert Sonny Carson of CORE, 
opposed many of the teachers’ demands during the 1967 round of 
bargaining. As they saw it, demands to remove disruptive children and 
spend more time on class preparation illustrated teachers’ racist disinterest 
in African American children. Contrary to the UFT slogan “Teachers 
want what children need,” Carson and his followers viewed the strike as 
further evidence of the teachers’ greed. Already skeptical of the union’s 
commitment to the African American community, they dismissed MES 
as an effort to reinforce a racist curriculum and prevent more community 
control over what African American children would be taught. Many 
African American teachers, who had joined the union as a vehicle for 
civil rights, agreed with Carson, at least when it came to the strike, and 
for the first time large numbers of them refused to support the UFT and 
crossed the picket lines.®
8 “Athens Steps Up Its Loyalty Purge,” New York Times, September 34, 1967, p. 30; J. 
Anderson, Bayard Rustin: The Troubles I’ve Seen (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1997). The Gotbaum-Shanker feud begins with this strike; see Freeman, Working Class New 
York, p. 335; J. Bellush, Union Power and New York: Victor Gotbaum and District Council 57 
(New York: Praeger, 1984).
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The divisions between the UFT and the African American community, 
and within the UFT itself, remained muted during the 1967 strike, but the 
conflicts sparked by the strike set the terms of the much larger conflagration 
that took place the next year in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville section of 
Brooklyn.
Ocean Hill-Brownsville
As in 1967, the conflict between the UFT and African American activists 
in Ocean Hill-Brownsville in 1968 took place against a backdrop of urban 
unrest, this time following the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. The 
assassination proved particularly tragic for Ocean Hill-Brownsville, because 
it ended an incipient movement for economic justice led by King that 
might have provided an alternative to the conflict that developed between 
labor and community. The alliance King envisioned at the time of his death 
would have rested on the two legs of an integrated civil rights organization 
and a more progressive labor movement. King’s last speech, which took 
place in Memphis during the strike of predominantly African American 
sanitation workers, spoke to the possibility of such a coalition, the outlines 
of which he developed as he worked on the strike with William Lucy, 
secretary-treasurer of the American Federation of State, County, and 
Municipal Employees (AFSCME). While King had originally seen his work 
in Memphis as a distraction from his work on the anti-poverty campaign, 
with its march scheduled for that summer, the discussions in Memphis led 
him to believe that the movement could go forward with help from the 
trade unions where new black leadership was emerging.^
King’s assassination on April 4, 1968, and the resulting urban unrest 
ended all such possibilities. Cities all over the country exploded in violence. 
Virtual insurrections took place in Chicago, Washington, D.C., Baltimore, 
Cambridge, Delaware, Cincinnati, Youngstown, Buffalo, Trenton, 
Newark, Jersey City, Kansas City, and Boston. Just six blocks from the 
White House, SNCC leader Stokely Carmichael urged his followers to 
“go home and get your guns.” It took 21,000 troops to calm the streets of 
the nation’s capitol, more in Chicago. The Pentagon set up a riot control 
unit and estimated that over 75,000 soldiers had been out on the streets 
enforcing citywide curfews, with orders to “shoot to kill” in some cities. 
In New York City, the poor community of Brownsville was burning. 
Firemen and police were met by young African Americans throwing stones
9 M. K. Honey, Going Doum Jericho Road: The Memphis Strike, Martin Luther King's Last 
Campaign (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007), pp. 169, 200; D. Appleby, A. Graham, and S. 
J. Ross, At the River I Stand (San Francisco: California Newsreel, 1993).
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and shouting “Kill whitey, out of our community!” One fireman thought 
his unit should comply. “If they want to bum up their neighborhood, it’s 
their business,” he said.*®
Against this background, the UFT faced off against African American activists 
in Ocean HiU-BrownsviUe in the spring of 1968. That these two groups could 
become direct adversaries was the result of a complicated process that mixed 
school reform, philanthropy, racial politics, and class stmggle. A year earlier, in 
the spring and summer of 1967, while the UFT negotiated its contract with 
the Board of Education, McGeorge Bundy, president of the Ford Foundation 
(and former Kennedy adviser who encouraged United States involvement in 
Viemam), committed to fund and promote independent community school 
boards in new “experimental” school districts in New York City. This move 
toward “decentralization” grew out of Bundy’s befref that plans to desegregate 
were inadequate. He declared an admiration for “legitimately militant black 
leaders. . . and their properly angry black words.” Embracing the Black Power 
declarations of SNCC and CORE, Bundy asked, “Who can deny the right 
of young black students to have a part of their lives kept black? And who can 
be surprised that many of them exercise that right?” In a press conference, he 
said he did not expect to agree with community activists on all of the public 
questions concerned, but he believed they could use the money to help channel 
the black rage in the urban north. Continuing with this frne of reasoning, 
Bundy thought “a little Black Power in the classroom would make the schools 
more responsive and more relevant to students and perhaps their reading and 
math scores would improve.”"
The New York City Board of Education accepted the Ford Foundation’s 
money and Bundy’s proposal for community control of schools by agreeing 
to establish experimental school districts. With this move, the board 
sidestepped the pending decentralization proposals in the state legislature, 
thereby hampering the UFT’s ability to shape the implementation of 
decentralization and community control. Because UFT officials disagreed
10 T. Johnson, “12 Anrested Here; Sporadic Violence Erupts in Harlem,” New York Times, 
April 5, 1968, p.i, 26; N. Sheehan “Army Has 15,000 For Riot Control,” New York Times, 
April 6, 1968, p. 25; D. Janson, “7 Die as Fires and Looting Spread in Chicago Rioting,” 
New York Times, April 6, 1968, p. i; R. Semple, “Capital’s Police Using Restraint,” New York 
Times, April 7, 1968, p. 62; J. Fhnt, “4,000 Guardsmen Stay in Detroit As City Keeps Curfew 
in Effect,” New York Times, April 7, 1968, p. 63; F. P. Graham, “Police Restraint in Riots,” 
New York Times, April 13, 1968, p. 16; “Long Wants Pohce to Shoot Looters,” New York 
Times, April 14, 1968, p. 56; B. CoUiers, “Jersey Guard Tightens Its Rules on Riot Control,” 
New York Times, April 14, 1968, p. 56.
11 N. M. Rooks, White Money, Black Power: The Surprising History of African American 
Studies and the Crisis of Race in Higher Education (Boston: Beacon Press, 2006), pp. 81, 
83-4. 90-
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with both their exclusion from the decentralization process and the details 
of the Bundy proposal, they were hostile to the experiment. By accepting 
the Ford Foundation plan, the board succeeded in weakening the UFT 
politically and pitting it against the community.’^
The first experimental school district started in Ocean HiU-BrownsviUe. 
An old industrial community nestled in Brooklyn just south of Bedford- 
Stuyvesant, Brownsville had been a blue-collar Jewish neighborhood until 
after World War II. As manufacturing declined in New York City in the 
1960s, the new, largely Airrican American and Latino migrants into the 
area suffered high unemployment and struggled with the decaying housing 
stock. The situation was similar in Ocean Hill, Brownsville’s much smaller 
neighbor to the northeast.'^ To get the new school district off the ground, 
the Ford Foundation turned to CORE, which it had funded for years. 
Sonny Carson led the effort. Bom and bred in Brooklyn, he was, by his own 
description, something of a gangland thug in his teenage years. He served 
in the Korean War with the 82nd Airborne division, an experience that 
radicalized him and motivated him eventually to join CORE. With a fluid 
set of politics that some labeled opportunist, he was a Black Nationalist in 
the late 1960s, and one of the most vocal critics of the UFT. He promised 
after the union’s 1967 strike to prevent the teachers who stmck from 
returning to “his” school district.''*
From the spring of 1967 through the spring of 1968, Carson, CORE members, 
and other community activists organized elections for the new Ocean Hdl- 
Brownsville district school board. The election results and the composition of 
the new local school board reflected their educational poHtics. Led by District 
Superintendent Rhoady McCoy but influenced heavily by CORE and Carson, 
the new board denounced the historic racism of the educational system both in 
the classroom and in the administration of schools. As they saw it, the existing 
system discriminated against African American teachers in examinations and 
licensing. Racist white teachers undermined African American children with 
their low expectations, colonialist mind-set, and Euro-centric curriculum. In 
contrast to the existing system, the board believed the schools could serve the 
community, give African American children a positive self-image, teach them 
the lost history of African American struggles, and lead them to believe in 
themselves as the arbiters of their own destiny.
12 M. Mayer, “The Full and Sometimes Very Simple Story of Ocean Hill, The Teachers’ 
Union and the Teachers Strikes of 1968,” New York Times Magazine, February 2, 1969, p. 18.
13 W. Pritchett, Brownsville, Brooklyn: Blacks, Jews and the Changing Pace of the Ghetto 
(Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 2002), pp. 132-3.
14 Sonny Carson, The Education of Sonny Carson (New York, n.p., 1972), pp. 141-3; P- 
Kihss, “School Leaders See Bias to Oust Principals,” New York Times, May 22, 1967, pp.i, 
24; Murphy, Blackboard Unions, pp. 237-43.
238 MURPHY
To accomplish its goals of transforming the schools, the board insisted 
on the right to hire teachers committed to its vision and fire those who 
did not share its predilections. However, the zeal with which it sought 
independence had its contradictions: the teachers who first went into the 
Harlem schools and turned teaching around for young African American 
children, who were educational pioneers in celebrating Black History 
Week, were turned away from the Ocean Hill-Brownsville school 
district because now parents and community leaders suspected their 
sincerity in developing the minds of African American children. This 
suspicion arose from the black nationalism fast becoming the dominant 
perspective in Brooklyn’s African American community and found some 
justification in the UFT’s opposition to school decentralization as it was 
being implemented by the city’s Board of Education. There was also the 
simple issue of power.
On May 7, 1968, the experimental Ocean HiU-Brownsville school 
board tested the limits of its power by dismissing thirteen union teachers, 
five assistant principals, and one principal on the grounds that they 
opposed the board’s plan of community control. The teachers received 
no hearing and no alternative assignment, violations of the union contract 
and past practice of the central Board of Education. The dismissals sparked 
a series of strikes that spihed over from one school year to the next.**^ 
The entire debacle might have been avoided had the board waited just 
a few weeks until the summer, when the teachers could have been eased 
out of the district. In fact, all during the summer break, Albert Shanker, 
president of the UFT, Reverend Milton Galamison, a city civil rights 
leader, and Superintendent McCoy met for lunch once a week. All agreed 
that objectionable teachers would be quietly transferred. Galamison and 
Shanker thought that the issue had been settled when school started again 
in the fall.'^ McCoy, however, insisted upon the mass dismissals, and the 
strike began again on September 9.
The next two and a half months witnessed several long citywide teacher 
strikes, numerous community protests, bitter negotiations, accusations
15 M. L. King, Jr., Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community? (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1967); Kihss, “School Leaders See Bias,” New York Times, May 22, 1967; H. Bigart, 
“Negro School Ousts 19, Defies City,” New York Times, May 10, 1968, p. i; P. Hoffinan, 
“Ousted Teachers Get Mixed Advice; Donovan and Union Favor Work—Supervisors Say 
No,” New York Times, May 13, 1968, p. 39; 1. Buder, “Parents Occupy Brooklyn School as 
Dispute Grows,” New York Times, May 15, 1968, pp. i, 44.
16 L. Buder, “8 Brooklyn Schools Boycotted by 6,000,” Nem York Times, April II, 1968, pp. i, 
36; H. Bigart, “Negro School Ousts 19,” pp. i, 38; L. Buder, “i i Teachers Defy Local Dismissals,” 
New York Times, May ii, 1968, pp. i, 29; Buder, “Parents Occupy Brooklyn School.”
17 Parrish, “Teachers Strikes.”
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of racism and anti-Semitism, and near-violent confrontations. Increasing 
racial polarization characterized the conflict. McCoy fired an additional 350 
teachers who walked out in support of their dismissed colleagues. He then 
hired replacements, including many young militant teachers who supported 
community control of the schools. On several occasions when UFT 
teachers tried to return to work, Carson led protests of students, parents, 
and replacement teachers against the returning strikers, personally blocking 
their entrance to the schools. These confrontations were characterized by 
shouting, jostling, and other forms of intimidation, despite the presence of 
police. At one community meeting in Ocean Hill-Brownsville, militants 
surrounded Shanker and refused to let him leave the room. From then on, 
he used a bodyguard.
The UFT’s unstinting defense of union rights regardless of the 
community’s needs was interpreted as racist not only by black nationalists.
I Many militant teachers were growing disillusioned with the UFT. Shanker
* insisted on strict union discipline during the strike, leaving teachers who
i supported community control and the idea of self-determination little
[ room to maneuver. One of those teachers was Dick Parrish, a lifelong
i educator, who, as vice president of the national union, had made sure the
[ AFT was one of the few AFL-CIO unions that had honestly desegregated
’ by the late 1950s. He had played key role in making the UFT an important
; part of the school desegregation projects in New York City that began
I in 1964. Like other teachers who supported community control, Parrish
S had grown increasingly uncomfortable with the UFT’s unwillingness to
i support the new militancy of the African American community. Through
! the strikes in 1967, the spring of 1968, and finally the fall of 1968, Parrish
\ and other African American teachers grew increasingly angry with the
I union’s exclusive focus on bread-and-butter union issues and its disregard
for the community’s educational interests. By the final strike, Parrish 
was urging teachers to cross the picket lines and teach African American 
children.’®
Shanker contended that the strikes were about teachers’ procedural
18 William Simon, Oral History Collection, AFT papers, Walter Reuther Archives, 
pp. 80, loi. See also Richard Parrish Papers, Box i additions; Parrish called the affair 
“a blow to education and a boon to racism”; R. Parrish, “The New York City 
Teachers Strikes,” Labor Today (May 1969); D. Golodner, “The Integrating of the AFT 
Locals,” delivered at the Midwest History of Education Society Conference, October 
21-22, 2005. The ATA, the City Teachers’ Association, and the United Parents 
Association all called for volunteers to keep schools open during the strike; T. A. 
Johnson, “Negro Teachers Give School Plan,” New York Times, September 20, 1967, p. 
37; L. Buder, “Lindsay Proposes a 26-Month Plan for School Peace,” New York Times, 




rights, about preventing a precedent that would undermine the union s 
ability to protect teachers from the arbitrary power of the administration. 
He insisted that the UFT was not opposed to community control or 
decentralization. But his demand for complete union discipline polarized 
the situation by brooking no compromise between the union s rig ts 
to protect teachers and the community’s right to decide its curriculum^ 
He further stoked the conflict by exaggerating the anti-Semitism o 
the African American community-control movement. Despite the fact 
that they had no connection to the Ocean Hill-Brownsville Board, 
CORE or any known organization, Shanker distributed 50,000 copies 
of anonymous anti-Semitic leaflets found in the mailboxes of several 
Ocean Hill-Brownsville teachers. These actions were designed to pit 
teachers against the community-control movement, especially Jewis 
teachers, and isolate the large minority of young, militant teachers hot 
black and white, who supported the African American struggle and 
wanted to push the UFT to take a more militant stance m favor of 
community control. Shanker’s tactics worked to some degree but not
entirely Of the teachers who crossed the picket lines m the fall o 19
to teach African American children, 70-80 percent were white, and 
half of them Jews.*'' Thus, Shanker’s willingness to polarize the confiict 
arose in part from his need to consolidate control over the union and
suppress internal dissent..
It took an outsider, the state commissioner of education, to convince aU
sides to settle the dispute. The union won the transfer issue, though most 
of the teachers fired by the local board were no longer m the district by the 
end of the strikes. The community experiment continued, but witlmut the 
funding of the Ford Foundation, which also stopped supporting CORE. 
Dick Parrish remained a vice president of the AFT, but as William Simon, 
another African American vice president of the AFT at the time, rec^e^d, 
“Dick differed with the leadership in New York m the Ocean Hi - 
Brownsville strike, [and as a result of his experience he] w^^mshed as a 
union person, as a human being . . . it’s a sin and a shame. ams was 
not the only one affected. The strike cast a long shadow over subsequent
teachers rebellions.
19 Podair, The Strike That Changed New York.
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Newark: Ocean Hill-Brownsville Redux
Big teachers strikes in Philadelphia, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Newark in 
1969 and 1970 followed the Ocean HiU-Brownsville conflagration. The 
strikes in the Midwest and West involved many issues, including union recog­
nition, contract negotiations, decentralization, and community control. 
Many of these were large strikes, involving tens of thousands of teachers. 
Only in Newark did the conflict take similar form as in Brooklyn, only this 
time it was a revolution.
Teachers in Newark had long struggled for union recognition, as 
they followed the successes in nearby New York City. Newark had 
always been a blue-collar industrial city, but in the late sixties it was 
divided between the large Italian community in the North Ward and 
the largely African American and Puerto Rican community in the 
South and Central Wards. Recognizing the potential for working- 
class community organizing in the slums of Newark, Tom Hayden and 
SDS’s Economic Research and Action Project (ERAP) moved into the 
city in 1964 to organize, much in the way that SNCC had in the South. 
By providing a left alternative to liberalism, the Newark ERAP project, 
dubbed the Newark Community Union Project (NCUP), hoped to 
challenge the Democratic machine politics ofMayor Hugh J. Addonizio 
and North Ward leader Anthony Imperiale, and to make Newark an 
example of how this kind of class-based organizing could encourage 
new leadership.
A city of 400,000 working people at the time, Newark had 
extraordinarily high rates of crime, maternal and infant mortality, 
tuberculosis, and venereal disease. A third of the housing was substandard. 
The unemployment rate was 15 percent and rising. Most importantly, the 
schools were in shambles. With one of the highest dropout rates in the 
nation, less than 10 percent of students achieved normal reading levels, 
and crime in the schools was rising. Worse still, the political establishment 
was so bankrupt that it preferred to appoint a white high school graduate 
as secretary of the Board of Education rather than an African American 
accountant with a master’s degree. Leaders of the local CORE chapter 
were so incensed by the appointment that they took over the Board of 
Education meeting, but it only justified the anger of the reactionaries, 
while NCUP stood helplessly by. Hayden’s project was running out of 
time in July of 1967 when the riot broke out.^^
In five days of rioting, twenty-six people were killed, a thousand were
22 Hayden, Reunion: A Memoir pp. 114-32, 151-64; F. R. Harris, T. Wicker, comp.. 
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injured, fourteen hundred were arrested, and $i6 million worth of property 
went up in flames. It took six thousand pohce, state troopers, and national 
guardsmen from two city armories to quell the storm. In Hayden’s own 
words: “It was an urban Vietnam.’’ Out of this cauldron came an uncanny 
alliance between Anthony Imperiale, the vigilante North Ward leader and 
racist nemesis of NCUP, and Amiri Baraka (formerly LeRoi Jones), the 
urban poet and playwright who was arrested during the riot for carrying 
guns. Both appeared on a radio show blaming the “so-called radical groups” 
for the city’s problems. Imperiale and Jones established a “hotline” with each 
other so that they could patrol their own neighborhoods in case of racial 
trouble. The government ofliered them funding for “local police patrols” in 
the city, a way to arm the racial divide that Hayden and his group had hoped 
to avoid. The rhetoric of violence combined with the politics of separatism 
to transform Newark into an armed camp. Hayden left the city in despair, 
but Jones claimed his hometown as something that would now become a 
black city, representing the black majority, with a black mayor and a black 
Board of Education. Although it took him another three years to do it, Jones 
would now lead the Black Power movement, and the conflict in Newark 
would make Ocean Hfll-Brownsville look like a picnic.
The teachers union in Newark had been lead largely by an Irish Italian 
group that had benefited from the rising power of their New York City 
compatriots. They had won a new contract after their successful 1966 
strike, but the New Jersey anti-strike laws meant one year of probation 
for thirty-one teachers and bankmptcy for the local. But in 1968, a new 
union alliance was formed under the leadership of Carole Graves, the first 
African American to head the union and one of the most important African 
Americans in the AFT. Meanwhile, Amiri Baraka formed a coalition of 
politicos that very explicitly meant to take over the city; in fact, during the 
King riots, Baraka assured reporters that there would be no riots in his town, 
as vigilante groups roamed the streets. “We’ve come to the conclusion that 
the city is ours anyway, that we can take it with ballots,” he said. The 
teachers union was one of the last integrated groups left in the city.^'*
Even as 200,000 students missed the first day of classes in the fall of 1969 
due to teachers’ strikes in other cities, the Newark teachers were hoping 
for a settlement. They finally struck on February 3, 1970, and although 
their strike was 90 percent effective, the opposition was strong. Baraka
23 “Mayor Convenes New Peace Talks in School Strike,” New York Times, September 
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conducted meetings throughout the South and Central Wards urging the 
black community to take over the schools. He argued that the teachers’ 
fear of school violence was racist, that the teachers’ demands for salary 
raises and release time for school preparation were attempts to evade the 
children who needed them. Three union leaders were arrested a few days 
later: Carole Graves, head of Local 481; Frank Fiorito, the executive vice 
president; and Donald Nicholas, a member of the union executive board. 
By the end of the week, thirty-nine teachers had gone to jail, and by the 
next week the number had risen to ninety-one. When the three-week 
strike ended, many teachers faced exorbitant fines and jail. The union 
victory had been bitter.^^
That spring, the mayor, Hugh J. Addonizio, was under indictment for 
cormption, and a new face, Kenneth A. Gibson, emerged in urban politics 
to challenge the incumbent in a run-off where “race is going to be the 
issue.” Gibson was the first black mayor of an eastern seaboard city, and 
immediately upon becoming mayor he appointed three new members of 
the school board, two African Americans and one Puerto Rican community 
leader. Imamu Amiri Baraka immediately set up an experimental classroom 
at the Robert Treat School, a rundown building in the Central Ward, as 
part of the African Free School, a plan to change the nature of classroom 
teaching. The certified teacher and four aides were dressed in the colors and 
costumes of Africa (green turbans, long black skirts, and red beads). They 
were called “mamas” and taught “collectively,” with Baraka frequently 
visiting the classroom and joining in the pledge of allegiance to the red, 
black, and green flag of black nationalism.
Critics accused Baraka of having too much power, claiming that he was 
mnning a regency under the Gibson administration where he and his coalition. 
Committee for a Unified Newark, dictated educational poHcy. Baraka denied 
it, saying, “I’m being painted as some kind of shadowy figure controlling the 
action behind the scenes, but this is not tme.” But his Africa Free School 
closely mirrored some of the same characteristics of the training given to black 
teachers in the Ocean HiU-Brownsville area, where he and H. Rap Brown, 
head of SNCC, had toured in the summer of 1967 and 1968 to promote self- 
determination in education. Unlike the situation in New York City, where 
the union was more powerful and the city less polarized, the Newark case was 
about to become far more violent and extreme in the next teachers’ strike.^'^
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The 1970 Newark teachers contract ran only one year. As it expired 
in Fehruary 1971, the new Board of Education decided that if it did not 
negotiate at all, it would not have a teachers union and, hence, there could 
be no strike. Exposing the inanity of that logic, the teachers walked out. 
Then, when ordered to negotiate, the Board of Education announced 
that all union demands, including recognition, were on the table, and that 
they would roU back teacher gains to before the 1966 contract. That just 
prolonged the strike.
As the union executive board dispersed in front of its headquarters on 
the first evening of the strike, twenty-five men dressed in paramilitary 
uniforms, armed with baseball bats and knives, attacked the teachers. First 
they beat the men, then the women union leaders. Of the fifteen victims, 
five were treated at the hospital; one was kept overnight. As the strike went 
on, the violence continued. Teachers were attacked and beaten on picket 
lines; their cars were smashed and bombed. Carole Graves, the president of 
the union, had a bomb hurled into her home.^^ Though the paramilitary 
groups were never identified or brought to trial, they were most likely 
extreme black nationalists. Some observers attributed the violence to the 
newly organized Organization of Negro Educators (ONE), which went 
about the city trying to break the strike and whose members were seen 
in paramilitary outfits. Nevertheless, their president denied involvement. 
ONE, like other nationalist groups, condemned the strikers for abandoning 
the African American children of Newark.
The strike continued for ten weeks, and, while the labor movement 
embraced the teachers, the black community was split between two 
factions. Even the teachers were divided. ONE had members in the union. 
As Carole Graves insisted, “This is just a labor—management fight. Jesse 
Jacob [president of the school board] and Amiri Baraka inteiject this racial 
business because it’s a good way to break the union and get control of the 
schools.” Graves went to jail that spring for six months, and her temporary 
replacement was attacked while the struggle continued. After ten weeks of 
striking, mediation, and arbitration, the school board rejected a settlement 
in a raucous meeting and finally settled in the eleventh week.^*
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The End of Integration and Militancy
The tragedy of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville and Newark teachers’ strikes 
was that one of the few institutions that had fought racial segregation 
in the union movement, the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), 
became the very symbol of that racism. The project of integration had 
belonged to the AFT. Its leaders included African American teachers 
trying to transform the labor movement as a whole. But these strikes 
destroyed that possibility by forcing the African American leaders out of 
the AFT, demoralizing African American teachers, and reinforcing the 
conservative Shanker leadership. Nationally, the integrationist movement 
was over, and the teachers union, especially in Newark, would suffer 
the consequences. “Perhaps the real tragedy of the strike is that it makes 
it look like reason and racial integration won’t work in Newark. The 
teachers union, for all of its own militancy, is one of the very few really 
integrated organizations around here,” a local Democratic Party leader 
concluded.^’
Despite the bitterness it instilled, the racial divide did not end teacher 
militancy. Instead, economic crisis finally drew the era of teachers’ strikes 
to a close. Again, developments in New York City were emblematic. In 
the fall of 1974, Mayor Abraham Beame announced a fiscal crisis in the 
city, when his budget for 1974—5 was running $420 million short, in part 
because the city had to spend ii percent of its budget servicing its $ii 
billion debt, including $3.4 billion in short-term notes. Beame blamed 
his predecessor John Lindsay, whom he accused of negotiating overly 
generous contracts with more and more public workers unions. Albert 
Shanker, who had become president of the AFT and remained leader of the 
now statewide UFT, had a hard time coming to terms with the crisis. Two 
months after Beame’s lament, he asked the city for $2.78 billion for school 
improvements. By January 1975, however, the Board of Education was 
cutting seven hundred jobs and forcing new economies on the teachers. 
The banks were asking for 9.5 percent interest on a $500 million loan, and 
city bonds were selling at two-thirds of face value. The causes were readily 
identified: the decay of the city center, white flight, unionization of public 
employees, expansion of social services, inflation, and the doldrums of the 
financial industry. But the unions took the brunt of the blame.“
At first the unions refused to budge, but as the commercial banks refused 
to lend money to the city, the fiscal crisis deepened and the unions were
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drawn into negotiations to save the city. All of the municipal unions agreed 
to defer contractual demands, giving up billions of dollars in benefits and 
offering their pension funds to capitalize the city. “In terms of going deep 
into the pocketbook,” AFSCME head Jerry Wurf explained, we did a 
hell of a lot more than any of the banks. Yet we still ended up the villains.” 
Shanker claimed that education took the brunt of the cutbacks, 22 per cent 
cuts while other city services averaged about ii per cent.”^' The teachers 
disproportionate burden grew in part from Shanker’s alienation from other 
New York municipal union leaders, especially AFSCME District Council 
3 7 leader Victor Gotbaum, who did the bulk of the negotiating with the city 
and the banks. Shanker claimed that teachers relied on the state legislature, 
not the city, for school funding, but it was his hostility to Gotbaum and 
sanitation union leader John DeLury that kept him from participating in 
the negotiations until October 1975. The teachers also paid for the failure 
of their strike in September 1975.
Ostensibly, the strike protested the large class sizes and poor school 
conditions teachers faced on opening day. Schools had opened with a lack 
of textbooks and desks, programs were in confusion, teacher assignments 
and reassignments went well into October. The real reason for the strike 
was the fiscal crisis and the Board of Education’s demands for a new contract 
that would eliminate most of the gains teachers had made, especially those 
won in the late 1960s. Included in those gains was a limit on class size of 
thirty-two, now routinely violated as the Board of Education cut back the 
number of teachers while the number of students remained the same. The 
Board demanded an additional thirty minutes of teaching per day and cuts 
to preparation time. In a disingenuous move, the board offered to keep to 
the limits on class size if the teachers would give up their prep time, arguing 
that they were only asking to increase teacher productivity, as if preparation 
had nothing to do with quality in education. Some 55,000 teachers struck 
that September, but they found little support from other municipal unions, 
who viewed the teachers as selfish for not agreeing to the same cuts they 
had taken. Not surprisingly, many in the African American community also 
thought the teachers selfish, seeing the strike and its demands to protect 
preparation time as further evidence that the teachers did not care about 
their children.^^
In the end, the teachers took the same cuts as the other municipal unions.
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The Board of Education saved between $4.5 and $5.5 million each of the 
eight days the teachers were out, but the city won much more. Teachers 
worked longer days, but the students’ days were shortened by forty-five 
minutes. African American parents were furious. Teachers gave up two of 
their preparation hours weekly. Class sizes stayed the same. Still the teachers 
remained the villains. They hated the contract, but they swallowed it. Even 
worse, prompted by the fiscal crisis, the Board of Education made drastic 
cuts that reduced or eliminated guidance counselors, crossing guards, sports 
programs, adult education, and summer school. From 1974 to 1976, the 
teaching workforce shrunk by nearly 25 percent, with most of the layoffs 
hitting young teachers. African American and Spanish-surnamed teachers 
were also hurt, and their percentage in the teaching workforce shrank to 3 
percent from ii percent. The impact was dramatic. Morale plummeted and 
union strength ebbed. The teachers’ days of militancy were over.^^
Dream Deferred
In remembering the heady days of teacher militancy during the late 
sixties and early seventies, it is easy to forget what was attempted while 
remembering who succeeded and who failed. In Memphis, the sanitation 
workers and the Afncan American community built something significant 
with lasting implications. In other cities, African American municipal 
workers organized unions and brought civil rights struggles and labor 
struggles together. Community control was not always met with union 
hostility. Martin Luther King, Jr. recognized the significance of going on 
with the struggle. “Nothing would be more tragic than to stop at this 
point in Memphis,” he said the day before he was shot. And it would only 
add to the tragic side of the story if we stopped analyzing school struggles 
yesterday or today.
Consider, for example, the fact that urban schools stUl suffer from terrible 
inequality, with suburban white children receiving weU-funded public 
education while urban African American children attend badly funded 
charter (private) schools. The origins of school choice and its complement, 
privatization, go back to 1968. As African Americans demanded control 
over their schools, many conservative pundits and politicians quickly 
realized that such demands could be accommodated without much cost or
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inconvenience to their core constituents in the lily-white suburbs. Instead 
of busing to achieve integration, African Americans could control their 
neighborhood schools, which were doomed to underfunded status given 
the urban tax base. Suburban schools, meanwhile, would prosper free of 
the burden of educating the city’s children. It is no coincidence that school 
choice and privatization are most often touted for urban schools, not the 
suburbs.
Consider, too, that African American leaders in the teachers unions were 
ready to lead their unions in a new direction. Many observers remember 
the names of LeRoi Jones and Sonny Carson; few remember that there 
were also leaders like Dick Parrish, Carole Graves, and WiUiam Simon in 
the AFT, who were real classroom teachers fighting to reform the schools 
and the union they helped build. The narrative of teacher militancy is a 
complex one, but it helps to explain how public employee unionism in this 
period cannot be separated from the urban rebellion, and how the inability 
of the two to come together played a key role in breaking apart the labor- 
civil rights coalition King dreamed about.
